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Introduction
A long-standing tenet of clinical trial
conduct is that the accumulating data
must be monitored, if not continuously
then at regular intervals during the trial.
Such regular review helps to ensure that
risks to participants are not greater than
anticipated and that the study is being
conducted appropriately. Early random-
ized trials were typically monitored by the
investigator(s), the research funder (a
government agency or a pharmaceutical
company), or by a steering committee
appointed by the funder [1], with no well-
accepted quantitative criteria for decision-
making and often with the accumulating
data widely known.
The practices of data monitoring com-
mittees (DMCs; also known as Data and
Safety Monitoring Boards [DSMBs]) have
evolved substantially over the last 40 years.
Statistical methods to guide early termi-
nation decisions have been developed [2–
5]; the principle of confidentiality of
interim data has become widely accepted;
and the actual conduct of DMC meetings
has become more standardized. Many
publications, an international US National
Institutes of Health (NIH) symposium [6],
and at least three books [7–9] have
addressed the philosophical and opera-
tional issues faced by DMCs; in the United
States, the NIH and the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) have estab-
lished policies regarding DMC establish-
ment and operation [10,11], as have
international organizations [12,13]. A
large study of DMC practices commis-
sioned by the United Kingdom’s Health
Technology Assessment group has provid-
ed substantial detail regarding current
DMC practices [14–16].
Despite the increased attention to DMC
function, some issues remain controversial.
Two of particular importance are 1) the
extent to which DMC members and the
statistician analyzing interim data and
reporting to the DMC should be indepen-
dent of the trial sponsor and investigators;
and 2) the criteria that should be used to
guide early termination decisions. A third
issue, of increasing concern to scientists
serving on DMCs, is that of liability of
DMC members.
Independence of the DMC and
the Reporting Statistician
When selecting scientists to evaluate
research findings, there is inevitable ten-
sion in seeking the most knowledgeable
experts while minimizing real or perceiv-
able conflicts of interest. The more
knowledgeable and experienced a scientist
is in a given area of research, the greater
the likelihood that s/he will have some
connection with any study in that area that
could be perceived as a conflict of interest.
(Similar tensions apply to selection of
members of scientific and regulatory
advisory committees, practice guideline
committees, and reviewers for medical
journals.) Currently, study investigators
and employees of the manufacturer, who
have clear conflicts of interest, are typically
excluded not only from serving on the
study DMC but also from attending
sessions at which interim results by
treatment group are presented and dis-
cussed. Other conflicts are more subtle.
Should someone holding any amount of
stock in a company be permitted to serve
on a DMC for a study evaluating that
company’s products? What about some-
one serving as investigator in another
study of the product, or any product, from
the sponsoring company? Or an investi-
gator serving on the company’s speaker’s
bureau? Such individuals are often, but
not always, excluded from serving on a
DMC because such individuals might
favor, or be perceived to favor, an
outcome aligned with their personal inter-
ests. (When the clinical trials of rofecoxib
[Vioxx], a COX-2 inhibitor that was
ultimately withdrawn from the market
due to adverse cardiovascular effects, were
closely examined, it was discovered that
the chair of the DMC of one important
trial had nontrivial financial relationships
with the product’s manufacturer [17].
This revelation surely added to the belief
of many, fairly or unfairly, that the chair,
perhaps subconsciously, might not have
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Pevaluated the safety data as rigorously as
he otherwise would have.)
Of course, the fact that an investigator
holds stock in a company, or that s/he
serves as a scientific advisor to the
company for other purposes, does not
necessarily imply that that investigator will
be influenced by that connection to give
more weight to protecting the company
than study participants, but this can never
be proven one way or the other. Concerns
about unwanted influence on DMC mem-
bers have increased to the point that some
have advocated removing the selection of
DMC members from the hands of com-
panies entirely, placing that authority in
an independent public body [18]. This
solution may be overly extreme—it is
difficult to imagine a single organization
being able to effectively constitute appro-
priately expert DMCs for all trials run by
the pharmaceutical industry—but more
attention is needed to avoid conflicts of
interest. Two possible approaches would
be to intensify institutional review board
(IRB) or FDA oversight of member
selection. It seems unrealistic to expect
multiple IRBs to review a trial’s DMC
membership in sufficient detail to identify
conflicts of interest, but if central IRBs
became standard in multisite trials, IRB
review of the DMC membership, includ-
ing financial disclosures, with the authority
to reject members who appeared too close
to the trial sponsor or had other significant
conflicts, could be one solution. Alterna-
tively, the FDA could review a company’s
proposed DMC membership, in the same
way it reviews potential members of FDA
advisory committees, and disapprove any
member with an apparent conflict of
interest. Implementation of either of these
options would be challenging. Currently,
while many have advocated central IRBs
for multisite trials we are far from
consensus as to whether this would be
desirable [19,20]. It could be more
straightforward for the FDA to take on
this oversight, but it would add substan-
tially to the resources required for regula-
tory review.
DMCs for trials sponsored by noncom-
mercial funders do not necessarily operate
in the same way as DMCs for industry
trials. For example, the widely accepted
prohibition of sponsor representatives
participating in DMC meetings with
access to the unblinded interim data has
not been applied by most US government
sponsors. Wittes et al. [21], in describing
the monitoring of the Women’s Health
Initiative (WHI) clinical trials, noted the
unwillingness of the US National Heart
and Blood Institute (NHLBI), whose
representatives had access to the interim
data and participated fully in the moni-
toring sessions, to permit the committee to
discuss recommendations in an ‘‘executive
session’’ without NHLBI representatives.
The NHLBI also pressured the committee
at times in regard to the direction its
recommendations should take. A 2009
paper describing NHLBI monitoring pro-
cesses stated that when the NHLBI is
unhappy with recommendations from a
monitoring committee, it works with the
committee to develop revised recommen-
dations that NHLBI will accept [22]. If the
study sponsor is permitted to pressure its
advisors regarding the recommendations
they should make, the whole concept of an
independent expert committee is under-
mined. This is particularly true when the
outside experts depend on the NIH for
their research funding and may therefore
be reluctant to persist in advocating
recommendations that the participating
program staff does not like. Concern about
such issues has led the US National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) to exclude staff members with
any scientific involvement in a research
study from the interim monitoring process
[23]. NHLBI has also recently modified its
policies to permit executive sessions with-
out the presence of any NHLBI staff, and
appears to be more restrictive of NHLBI
staff participation in sessions at which
confidential interim data are presented
[24].
Other conflicts relate to the statistician
performing the interim analysis and re-
porting to the DMC. Traditionally, this
role has been played by the primary study
statistician. Difficulties can arise, however,
when mid-course changes to the study are
contemplated. For example, a study might
be focused on improvement in heart
failure, but if another study of the same
or related drug reported a highly positive
survival advantage with little impact on
heart failure, the sponsors of the first study
might want to consider changing their
primary endpoint to survival. If the study
statistician (who participates in the deci-
sion to change the endpoint) knows that
the interim results strongly favor survival,
people might question whether, had the
results not favored survival, the statistician
would have found subtle ways of discour-
aging the change. Such influences would
compromise the interpretability of the
final data.
Such situations do not occur frequently,
but when they do it is important to ensure
that needed changes to trial design can be
made without undermining trial integrity.
One solution, which has been adopted for
most industry-sponsored trials and some
government-sponsored trials, is to involve
two statisticians in the trial, one to work
with the study team on design issues and
trial management, and the other to
perform interim analyses and report to
the DMC. This is sometimes referred to as
the ‘‘independent statistician’’ model
[25,26] and was recommended by the
FDA in its 2006 guidance document on
clinical trial data monitoring committees
[11]. Although this model has worked well
for many trials [27,29], a potential disad-
vantage is that the statistician doing the
interim analysis may not be as knowledge-
able about the study as the statistician
involved in the design and management,
potentially hampering effective communi-
cation with DMC members [28]. An
alternative approach is to have the study
statistician serve as the analyst for interim
data, as has traditionally been done, but if
changes to the design are contemplated
assign a different statistician, who has not
seen the interim data, to implement the
change. This approach may be more
Summary Points
N Although there is substantial consensus regarding the need for interim
monitoring of certain types of trials, there is controversy about specific aspects
of data monitoring.
N Approaches to ensuring independence of those who perform the interim
monitoring and confidentiality of interim data vary substantially by type of trial
and trial funder.
N The ‘‘independent statistician’’ model, involving a separate statistician to
analyze interim data and report to the data monitoring committee (DMC),
remains controversial but provides important protections of data integrity.
N Early stopping guidelines should be clearly understood and accepted by all
parties, and only deviated from if there are unexpected findings that confound
the overall benefit-risk assessment at interim analysis.
N Liability of DMC members is an important concern that has not been dealt with
adequately by either commercial or government trial sponsors.
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of the primary study statistician remains
available to the DMC, and the second
statistician is not required as long as no
major interim design changes are consid-
ered. As additional experience is gained
with these models a consensus may emerge
regarding the optimal approach, but it is
clear that decision-making about mid-
course changes in trial design should be
done without knowledge of interim results.
Early Termination of Trials
A long-accepted ethical principle for
clinical trials is that trials should not
continue if interim data provide definitive
evidence of the superiority of one of the
treatments. A trial whose results showed
200 deaths on one arm and five deaths on
the other, for example, would be severely
criticized on the grounds that a survival
difference would have been evident far
earlier, and many of the 200 deaths on the
inferior arm should have been averted. On
the other hand, in the early days of clinical
trials when investigators routinely re-
viewed interim data, it was not uncommon
for trials to stop as soon as interim findings
became nominally statistically significant
[30], increasing the likelihood of false
positive reports and limiting the credibility
of the results. Guidelines were developed
during the 1970s and 1980s to permit
early termination with valid claims of
statistical significance [2–5].
A difficulty, however, is that what
constitutes ‘‘definitive evidence’’ is inher-
ently subjective. This issue has been
debated for decades [31,32] without
resolution. Those who are more negative
about early termination fear that smaller
trials are less reliable and will not be
widely persuasive, and therefore will not
lead to changes in medical practice. A
recent variation on this argument is that
early termination of trials should be
avoided because it leads to artificially
elevated estimates of treatment effect;
trials that stop early, of course, show
higher estimates of effect than trials of
the same regimens that do not stop early
[33,34]. Others have countered that there
is nothing nefarious about the obvious fact
that trials that stop early show higher
treatment effects, that any upward bias is
small and methods to correct the bias are
readily available, and that the ethics of
continuing trials of proven life-saving
treatments to gain at best minor improve-
ments in estimation of effect are question-
able [35–38].
The implication of this debate for a
DMC is that the DMC, the study
sponsors, and the study investigators must
all understand and be comfortable with
the criteria for early termination proposed
as the basis for trial monitoring, with the
understanding that unanticipated issues
may always arise that would lead a
DMC to ignore the pre-specified criteria.
For example, the efficacy boundary could
be crossed, but an unanticipated safety
concern could have arisen so that further
study is needed to determine whether
benefit outweighs the risk. Although it is
well accepted that a DMC will regard
stopping criteria as guidelines rather than
strict rules, a DMC should be prepared to
apply the agreed-upon criteria unless there
are reasons to question the benefit-to-risk
assessment. It has been suggested that a
DMC might appropriately ignore the pre-
stated stopping criteria if its members were
simply skeptical that the effect was as large
as that being observed [39]; this would
suggest, however, that the stopping criteria
were inappropriate and the DMC should
have asked for more stringent criteria
initially.
Liability of DMC Members
The issue of liability coverage for DMC
members has arisen as a concern only in
recent years, as litigation has increasingly
permeated medical research. It is difficult
to cite cases; I have colleagues who have
been consulted in such cases but they have
all been settled with confidentiality agree-
ments. Nevertheless, concerns on the part
of DMC members have increased to the
point that several NIH institutes are now
providing coverage through contractors to
individuals serving on their DMCs. Phar-
maceutical companies are often (but not
universally) willing to indemnify members
of their DMCs; proposed language to be
written into DMC contracts for industry
studies was provided by DeMets et al.
[40]. Such indemnification is probably not
the optimal solution, as a DMC member’s
defense handled by legal staff of a
pharmaceutical company could be com-
promised by the staff’s primary responsi-
bility to defend the company [41]. A better
approach would be the availability of
insurance policies that DMC members
could purchase on an individual basis,
with the cost of such a policy factoring into
the fee a member would negotiate with a
company. For an insurer to offer such
policies, however, would require informa-
tion about the risks it would face, and
because of the limited information avail-
able the development of such policies by
insurers would be challenging.
Conclusion
DMCs have become expected compo-
nents of many clinical trials, and provide
an important oversight function. With
increased experience, debates about best
practices, as well as new issues, have
emerged. New approaches are needed to
ensure that DMC members do not have
unacceptable conflicts of interest. Conflict
of interest concerns relate also to the
access to interim results. Such concerns
have led to exclusion of industry represen-
tatives from involvement with interim
monitoring, but the potential conflicts of
noncommercial sponsors have not been
adequately recognized. The ‘‘independent
statistician’’ issue, on the other hand,
seems to be resolving in favor of a model
in which those making day-to-day deci-
sions about trial design and conduct are
protected from knowledge of interim
results. The key to making such models
successful is the presence of statisticians
knowledgeable about the trial in both the
trial management and the DMC reporting
roles. Other issues, such as the appropriate
stringency of early termination boundar-
ies, appear less amenable to consensus, at
least currently, because the characteristics
of particular trials, and the philosophies of
trial organizers, are too varied. The best
one can hope for is that for any particular
trial, the trial sponsor, investigators,
DMCs, and IRBs are all in agreement
about the monitoring approach taken for
that trial. Finally, concerns about potential
exposure of DMC members to litigation
are relatively recent but need to be taken
seriously by DMC members and trial
sponsors. The decision of some NIH
institutes to establish protection for DMC
members serving on institute DMCs is a
welcome development.
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